1s Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i, while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur. Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never [illegible] literary status.

The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qadhā and naḥiya; and the Kurds, in turn, supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Ṭuz Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of
162 the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few
184 households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar, from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to 'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boat-builders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

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The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants had been largely driven from the field. Western education was widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch. Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nestorians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians, whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq. The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping, artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually schools, served for long years past by the missions of European churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls' schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by families whose property or politics constrained them to live there, by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MHI Iraq MHI

home, at Neri village, of Sayid Muḥammad Sadīq, son of the notorious Christian-murderer, Shaykh 'Ubaydullah—to the Tigris at Jazira-ibn-'Umar. This zone, governed from Julamark the capital of Ḥakkari, was inhabited or was traversed in their migrations by tribes of great renown—the Goyan, Sharnakhi, and Artushi, whose chiefs twenty years earlier had welcomed the prestige and profit of raising Ḥamidiya cavalry regiments for their Caliph.

In place of the free Kurdish dynasties at Bitlis, Jazira-ibn-'Umar, and Julamark of half a century earlier, there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a régime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish Government. Scattered amid the Kurdish villages in both wilayas were communities of Armenians, Chaldaeans, Jews, and Assyrians.

The last-mentioned community was a generation later to play, transplanted and half-destroyed, a dismal part in 'Iraq history. These East Syrian or Nestorian or Assyrian shepherds and cultivators were an ancient Christian Millet, Syriac in speech, uncertain of origin and of blood, and hardly distinguishable in their manner of life, dress, and custom from the Kurds, in whose truculent or tolerant midst they had existed for many centuries. They were protected by their resolute character and jealous loyalty to their own faith and leadership. The Mar Sham'un of the time, their spiritual head and community ruler, resident at Kuchanis, had been for half a generation supported by a mission of the Church of England. This divided its efforts between the Ḥakkari Assyrian clans, with their fighting maliks and rough illiterate bishops, and the more peaceful, less harassed branch of the people who had settled at Urmiya. The former group, Turkish subjects, were in part *'ashiret*—tribute-paying tribes—and in part *ra'ayā*, peasantry. The nation contained perhaps one hundred thousand souls in Turkish territory. Faithful to an ancient Church, isolated in savage mountains, poor and threatened by every whim of powerful neighbours, though capable of a virile resistance and even of harsh aggression, its plight was watched by anxious eyes in Europe.

To the west of 'Iraq lay the steppe-desert where roamed the bedouin tribe-group of the 'Aniza. Southward of these, beyond the Dhafir and Muṭayr nomads, lay the communities of true Arabia: the small harbour State of Kuwayt, established a century earlier under the house of Ṣubaḥ; the coastlands of al-Aḥsā with its oases and its vigorous life of nomadic tribes; and, finally, central Arabia where for years past two dynasties had disputed for supremacy.

Of these districts, Kuwayt and the Wahhabi Amirate of ibn Sa'ud were static Arab sultanates; al-Aḥsā (part of the Sa'udi

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

stock-in-trade and monopoly of the Shi'i 'alim and mujtahid, who claimed on this basis to lead tribe and town in all secular affairs.

5. 'IRAQ SOCIETY: THE TRIBES

If elements of comparative social progress were to be found in the towns, how far did the great majority of the inhabitants outside still live in a world remote from change?—a world in which a particular range of inherited ideas, repugnances and loyalties obtained: where the manners and restrictions of urban life were unknown: where social observances, marriage and kinship, and the settlement of feuds had their traditional rules, unknown to Turkish law, and the desert virtues of hospitality and gallantry had their own interpretation. This detached specialized world surrounded, on every hand, the towns and greater villages of 'Iraq, dominated all communications, held nine-tenths of the cultivated land. The tribes, homogeneous in code and outlook and each the focus of intense loyalties, differed among themselves in important respects. Of the Arab tribes, roughly half were Sunni, half Shi'i; some, notably the Muntafiq confederation, were Shi'i with a Sunni ruling family; others contained sections of both the faiths. In Kurdistan Shi'i tribes were rare and, in places, suspected of deeper heresy. Such difference of religious allegiance was reflected in the extent to which the Shi'i tribes could be influenced by the mujtahids, and in the Sunni respect for the person of the Caliph. To the statesmen of Turkey the Shi'i sympathies of half 'Iraq were an offence and embarrassment.

The environment of the tribe affected not only its economics but its mode of life. The Kurdish nomads moved among settled folk; the desert Arabs abode in their own empty isolated world, from which arose their mental remoteness, their inaccessibility to Government forces, but also their vulnerability through dependence on the markets of the desert fringes. Such were the Dhafir of south-western 'Iraq, the 'Aniza of the Shamiya steppe, the Shammar of the upper Jazira, and smaller groups within 'Iraq. The environment of the settled cultivating tribes varied according to the irrigation method whereby they cultivated, and by the nature of their crops: the fruit or tobacco grower of Kurdistan, the wheat and vegetable grower of Samarrā were different enough from the date gardener of Ba'quba or the Shamiya, or the rice-field workers of the Albu Muḥammad or the Fatla. These folk were 'ignoble' in the eyes of the 'noble', feckless, starving aristocracy of the desert. Of the tribes of every type, the origins were at least as various as their environments, but less easy to formulate. In them all, the vital unifying and loyalty-evoking element was the name itself, and the complex of shared traditions for which it stood; but the how

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

habitual, and much admirable work was done by the departments. Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of the Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved and expected progress in material matters, over the familiar Turkish standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreaks so soon and so disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied.

It was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, this fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shi'i hierarchy whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for the Califate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and the indulgence of such feelings was the easier, and the new régime must remain the more rootless and untrusted, while peace with Turkey was delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British régime was foreign and unfamiliar. Its spokesmen, often weak in Arabic, differed from their predecessors, to the point of strangeness, in dress, manner, and social customs. The use of Indians as clerks and departmental subordinates was universal, and was resented. The efficiency at which the Administration aimed was no desideratum of the governed, and its ranking as a paramount objective has been alleged as a chief defect of the régime. The charge is doubtfully true; but in fact little was done to render the machinery of Government easy or acceptable to its public. It tended to rigidity of standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not always desired justice, and was pitiless to long-familiar laxities.

The disappearance of many restrictions with the Armistice still left the military occupation of notables' houses, military roads or camps which blocked canals, and other galling inconveniences. These grievances increased with time. With them came the disappointment and disillusion of post-war retrenchment; projects were abandoned, departments restricted, military expenditure greatly reduced. After all, it seemed, no golden age had arrived! The Railway, Indian-staffed, was slow and expensive. The outcry for schools and English lessons was unmet. The agricultural experts had not transformed agriculture, those of irrigation had cured neither drought nor floods. The Land Registry settled few disputes. And the insistence on full revenue collection on every crop and garden was galling alike to rich and poor, who, in spite of lowered demand-rates, found themselves paying more taxation than ever before, with little or no improvement in the old and evil assessment methods.

In the towns the Administration, desperately short of subordinate

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1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

standards—and non-Muslims at that!—and without, perhaps quite involuntarily, adopting something of the airs of superiority and social exclusiveness which are of all things the least tolerable to the educated society of the modern East. These dangers the British were ill equipped to avoid; it followed that their unpopularity in 'Iraq, after years of Mandate, was widespread. It prevailed, with many individual exceptions, not only in ministerial and official circles but also among the very classes to whom their work had been the most advantageous.

It is certain that some measure of reform and reorganization was, in the clear interests of human welfare, desirable in the 'Iraq of 1918; certain too that it could never have been carried out without damage to the immediate interests of some loudly protesting class, be they Shi'i 'Ulamā, intellectuals, landlords or tribal shaykhs. Could such reforms have come from within, without Mandate or imposed foreign help? Only, one may judge, too slowly, too uncertainly, and in the end inadequately. Or would a Mandateless 'Iraq State, with its 'full independence' from the outset, have been willing of itself to employ foreign helpers and give them adequate authority and continuity? It is improbable; but if so, such a method might have yielded better results than a Mandate, if genuine popular goodwill is, as it must be, the true criterion. But to neither the excited spokesmen of nationalist 'Iraq in the Baghdad or the Damascus of 1919, nor to a British Government then harassed with the stresses and counter-claims of inexpert peace-making, was such a solution likely to occur. The Mandate was inevitable; its administration had had great merits, with real but less tangible defects; and its conclusion was welcome to all.

4. THE MINORITIES

The problem presented to the Sunni government and governing class by the Shi'i element, a minority in political status though a majority in numbers and containing eminent men of religion, landlords, business men, and the most militant tribes, was little considered at Geneva. Nevertheless, it equalled that of the Kurds in delicacy and in its need of a solution, and its dangers were to be notably shown within a few months of 'Iraq's attainment of independence. But as the Shi'is were 'Iraqis, lived in the heart of its territory and included no elements of obvious interest to any outside Power save Persia, the Shi'i problem lay beyond the observation of the world's statesmen. It was indeed a question less of minority rights than of a temptation which 'Iraqi politicians found irresistible: that of using the weight of Shi'i religion and tribal power as a weapon, fatally dangerous, in domestic politics.

The lesser true minorities—the Christian sects, Yazidis, Jews,

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

563 795 and Turkomans—made little history. The first-mentioned were accepted as equals in 'Iraqi society and administration as completely as any non-Muslim could expect; and when the announcement of British withdrawal led in 1929 to some heart-searching among the timorous, the heads of the communities had no difficulty in reassuring their flocks and urging continued loyalty to their King. A ministerial tour among them in 1931 led to great cordiality and the official thanks of the Apostolic Delegate. It was found not too difficult in 1930 to draft and pass into law new statutes for some of these Christian minorities, defining the powers of their priesthoods and councils. The measure of self-management which they accepted was bound, in a modern State, to fall far short of old millet autarchy.

The tiny community of inoffensive Baha'is in Baghdad was in these years the victim of an episode—that of the long-famous case of the Baha'i Houses—sadly destructive of confidence in 'Iraqi justice. They had begun in the middle 'twenties to repair their properties in the city. Fanatical Shi'i neighbours resisted this, petitioned the King and obtained from him, although the case was still *sub judice* in the Baghdad Peace Court (which later gave judgement for the Baha'is), a direct order for the eviction of the owners and confiscation of the keys. This action and the subsequent majority verdict of the Court of Appeal in favour of the Shi'i aggressors represented to objective observers an apparent overruling of justice by the rancours of local politics. It was ventilated at Geneva and was the subject of repeated protest by the High Commissioner, but in vain. The case, in itself petty and embarrassing enough to the 'Iraqi authorities, was a sinister warning to other non-Muslim elements.

563 The unselfconscious Turkomans of Kirkuk, Kifri, and their villages made no efforts to emerge from a useful and honest obscurity; they created no problems since the Mosul settlement, and were represented in 'Iraqi officialdom far beyond their numerical proportion. The Jews were still compact, assiduous, self-sufficient, and unambitious. They had had their outstanding Finance Minister, kept their place in the Government offices, dominated many of the markets, owned property, and supported their own schools and hospitals; and when 'Iraq approached its independence, were not so foolish as to compromise their future by open protest. The art of living in 'Iraq, and surviving bad times, was no new one to them. It was true that 'Iraqi, like all Arab, feeling was strong against the Zionist movement in Palestine; ugly and violent street demonstrations, accompanied by the usual marshalled schoolboys and armed roughs, greeted Sir Alfred Mond when he visited Baghdad on business in February 1928; and in the

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

VII

AL-ISTIQLAL AL-TAMM

1. ASSESSMENT IN 1932

PREVIOUS chapters have shown how great a distance 'Iraq had travelled by 1932 from its age-long status as a group of three remote and backward Turkish wilayas in northern Arabia. The moment of its completion of twelve years as a constitutional State since the first 'Iraq Government was set up, and its achievement of full independence, may not be ill chosen for an assessment of its accomplishment and its prospects as they then appeared.

A Kingdom of 'Iraq had been created, and was world-recognized. It had secured beyond future questioning its northern third—the Mosul wilaya—claimed with determination by others; it had fixed or was fixing its boundaries to east and west; it had gone far to establish with its neighbours firm and friendly relations, the perfecting of which should be no formidable task for succeeding years. Within 'Iraq, the nation enjoyed great and evident advantages. It had neither a menacing over-population like Egypt, nor an exiguous territory like the Lebanon, nor a mere handful of oases in vast deserts like Sa'udi Arabia. It had abundant space, great rivers, famous fertility, a healthy if severe climate, and the certainty of increasing population. Its people were in no way below the average of humanity in moral qualities, and above it in intelligence. The appreciation of possible progress and the desire for it were widespread. And in the matter of administration, whatever disobedience or local disloyalty might lurk within its borders, the Baghdad Government's claim to authority was disputed by no rival pretensions; its rule was effective in nearly the whole territory.

At this point, however, reflection suggests some qualification: the picture of peaceful unquestioned sway over all 'Iraq is too favourable. The areas of Arab steppe and Kurdish mountain in which the writ of Government scarcely ran can indeed be ignored: its power would doubtless extend into these with developed forces and communications, and with time. But much must be altered before the 'Iraqi public in the main areas of the country came to resemble, for better or worse, that of a modern nation in which Government could operate with beneficence, and which would both permit and appreciate such operation. Without insistence on a uniformity which could be valueless or deadening, the political health and administrative manageability of a nation are inconsistent with the presence either of enclaves of too deeply diverse cultures

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

182 563 795 or loyalties, or of excessively disparate levels of social development, and in 'Iraq there existed both unassimilated minorities and outstanding differences in the level of evolution between social classes. References have been made elsewhere to the problem presented by the Kurds' character, tradition, habitat, and language and their separatist ambitions, whether of powerful tribesmen or of the intelligentsia of Sulaymaniya. Assyrians, Yazidis, and resident Persians all represented heterogeneous, ill-absorbed elements. The inter-sectarian asperities of the Christian Churches were unimportant, but not so that deep, historic cleavage of Sunni and Shi'i which was for ever dividing and embittering the political world. If by and after 1932 Shi'i leadership was less fanatical and less foreign, the 'Ulamā of Najf yet retained much power and Shi'ism was still the unifying force, the super-tribal loyalty, of an uprising and unsatisfied bloc; and on the Euphrates, too often as the ally of a decentralization not far from anarchy, it was a main embarrassment of the Government. The existence and vitality of these distinct minorities and self-conscious cultural groups remained a feature adverse to 'Iraq's progress.

181 511 But, minorities and sects apart, it was clear that the 'Iraqi masses were as yet in no full sense citizens of their country. The lower classes, even in town and suburb, were deeply ignorant and miserably poor and, while not strange to some of the visible phenomena of Government, were neither able nor tempted to take their part in a democratic régime for the control of their own destinies. In the tribes, who still formed the great bulk of the population, ignorance was yet deeper, environment more primitive; and their feudal or patriarchal conception of society was wholly at variance with the citizen's outlook in a modern State. The tribal population of 1932 was in essentials scarcely changed from the level of its fathers; the constitutional progress of the 'Iraq State had far outstripped any social or material progress of this major part of its people.

185 Nevertheless, for all who were accessible to Government's efforts and willing to come within its orbit, much had been done. An Army and a police force had been formed adequate to internal needs and likely, with such development as succeeding years would bring, to be able to guarantee security of life and property. The administration of justice was generally satisfactory, and future years, it could be hoped, would increase its accessibility and popular confidence in it. The country's material problems and potentialities had been, for fifteen years, studied and analysed by modern eyes and brains: hopes had been revealed, dangers appreciated, and experience stored. The backwardness of its agriculture could be corrected, it seemed, by feasible new methods and cul-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

kilometre in Ḥilla liwā, 46 in Karbalā, 40 in Baghdad, followed by Baṣra, Muntafiq, and Sulaymaniya. In all parts, various as they were in scene and tradition, the manner of life imposed for centuries by the local environment, resources, and social groupings remained, at first glance, substantially unchanged. The following pages will offer results of a closer look at the 'Iraq society of the mid-century.

Towards the evolution of a less heterogeneous, less unmanageable public than that of 1900 there had been in fifty years some progress, but the transformation was clearly incomplete. The distinction of Sunni and Shi'i remained not only doctrinally but socially and politically recognizable. It was true that in Government service and the professions little discrimination remained, in commerce the Shi'is had gone far to occupy the empty places of the Jews, and Mujtahid influence was much diminished; nevertheless, the old sectarian division was still a persistent element of disunity, and Shi'ism which could be used as the basis for political grouping would as such doubtless evoke a Sunni reaction. A politically conscious Islamic revival—a movement never without its appeal, as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were showing in Egypt—gave no sign of developing in 'Iraq; orthodox religion had lost much of its hold on 'enlightened' youth, education was almost wholly secular, and Islamic faith and observance grew ever rarer save among women and the elderly. If Islam, therefore, had been little used as a weapon of xenophobia, yet Shi'i claims and grievances could still inflame, the element of fanaticism still lurked, and the Shi'i tribes were still capable of following, if less readily and blindly than of old, the reactionary guidance of the Holy Cities.

Of the persistent minorities—religious, national, and racial—within the population, much has been said on other pages. The resident Persians still formed a powerless but a sensitive and embarrassing body, watched jealously from Teheran. The Turkoman villagers of Kirkuk liwā were increasingly but not yet wholly assimilated; they kept their dour character and their Turkish speech. The Yazidis were still forced by their creed and character into a social isolation uneasy but no longer formidable. The Assyrians now settled, it could be hoped, as a tolerant and tolerated 'Iraqi minority, were still unassimilable and retained qualities and influences which precluded full confidence in a trouble-free future. The other Christian communities had changed little in their outlook, organization, or place in local society. Of the Jews, seven-eighths had left 'Iraq for ever, and of the remainder, which included highly-placed citizens, it was doubtful whether their future would be one of hostile Muslim pressure or of re-established security. Of the greatest of 'Iraqi minorities, the Kurds, enough

4: Wilson G-S (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
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000 of Assyrians under the Assyrian bishop, Mar Sergis, a jovial Friar Tuck of the Nestorian Church.

K 137 Kurdistan is a beautiful country. It is in the main well wooded, with scrub or stunted oak on the hillsides and poplars, walnuts and mulberries near the villages. Pines grow in two areas only and chinārs (planes) along the streams. Unfortunately, deforestation is proceeding apace, and unless immediate and drastic steps are taken by the 'Iraq Government, heavy soil erosion and a tremendous decrease in grazing facilities will take place. Few new walnut trees are to be found owing to a prevalent superstition that the planter of a walnut tree will die with the appearance of the first nuts. It might be supposed that the oldest inhabitants could be employed in planting, but apparently the grandfathers look askance at this suggestion!

K 181 The Kurds are a virile and cheerful people. They have been called treacherous, and undoubtedly stories can be quoted in support of this accusation. Yet it must be remembered that the annals of our own Scottish highlands are by no means clean in this respect.

K 164 221 342 In the summer the valleys of Kurdistan are, unfortunately, very malarial, and this is fostered by the cultivation of rice with its invariable accompaniment of mosquitoes. During this season most of the flock-owners move to their "zōzāns" or summer sheilings on the mountain tops, where, in shelters of oak branches, they pass the time pleasantly enough.

Christians

I ● 795 The Christians of the northern provinces are divided into numerous sects, several of which are relics of the old schismatic divisions of the Eastern Communion. They include Chaldeans and Syrian Catholics, who are under the control of Rome, Jacobites, Armenians, Nestorians and Seventh Day Adventists.

I 795 167 563 648 162 Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics and Jacobites are found in Mosul and many villages on the left bank of the Tigris. Chaldeans are also found in the Supna valley near Amadia and in one large village near Arbil. Seventh Day Adventists only flourish in Mosul. Many people in England know something of the Assyrians and their recent history. The Assyrians themselves claim to be descendants of the famous kingdom of Nineveh and are certainly semitic. The term "Assyrian" now includes ex-Ottoman members of the Nestorian Church who were domiciled either within what is now the 'Iraq state or who were ejected from Hakkari by the Turks during the Great War and refused

4s Wilson G-8 (no date) 1937 MH1 Iraq MH1
Yazidis MH 10

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readmission afterwards, and also members of other Christian sects belonging to the recognized tribes of Hakkari who accompanied their Nestorian brethren in the War exodus to 'Iraq via Persia. Since the Turks refused to readmit these people and Great Britain, when peace terms were concluded with Turkey, was not in a position to insist, it was necessary to try and find lands for them within the borders of the 'Iraq state. The Assyrians wished to be settled as a homogeneous unit, but this was impossible as it would have meant displacing a large number of Kurds. Many of the Assyrians were settled on such lands as were available, but in 1933 serious trouble broke out between some of these settlers and the 'Iraq Government, and incidents occurred which made it impossible for at any rate all the Assyrians to remain in 'Iraq. Various schemes were examined, including settlement in Brazil, British Guiana and on the Orontes in Syria. None of these, however, proved practicable, and the matter is still in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations. In the meantime 6,000 Assyrians have been settled temporarily on the River Khabur in eastern Syria, and the remainder, numbering some 20,000, are still in 'Iraq. Those in Syria include several complete tribes. The condition of those in 'Iraq may be said to be satisfactory at present and they possess very large numbers of animals of all kinds. Many are also employed as mechanics, clerks, etc., by the big oil companies and in the 'Iraq railways and police. All these possess 'Iraqi nationality. A certain number are also employed as aerodrome guards by the British Royal Air Force, duties which are shared by them with Arabs and Kurds. The Assyrians are a brave, hardy race, though obstinate as isolated, uneducated mountaineers are liable to be. It is indeed a tragedy that they should have been caught up in the wheel of events and severely mangled in the process.

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The Yezidis

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The Yezidis are usually known as "devil-worshippers." This is, however, a misnomer. "Devil-propitiators" would be more correct. They believe that Satan, whom they call Mālik Tāūs or the Peacock Angel, was exiled from Heaven for a definite period and is, after the lapse of a few thousand years, to be restored to high favour. It is incumbent on them therefore to keep on the right side of him, so that he may then use his influence on their behalf. It is extremely difficult to investigate the Yezidi religion. The priests teach that education, save for their caste, is forbidden by the "Black Books," the Yezidi

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

INITIATION OF ADMINISTRATION

Mudīr al-Ma'ārif (Director of Education) in every wilayet, each having a budget,[1] staff, syllabus and long list of schools. To judge by results, however, the system was a 'whited sepulchre'. The schools were rarely as numerous nor as well attended as government statistics indicated; the teachers possessed little learning and even less moral character. Arabic was little stressed as a language. Shī'īs, comprising the majority of the population, would not send their sons to government schools, invariably taught by Sunnīs, nor were they encouraged to do so by the Sunnī Ottoman Government.

Mr. Dobbs, as Revenue Commissioner, had, in early 1915, studied the educational problem and had written suggestions for British policy.[2] He advocated extreme caution in initiating a new system in order that the mistakes made in India might be avoided. The shortage of primary teachers led him to declare that if it were not for the urgent necessity of equipping Arabs for government service and for avoiding the imputation that the British Administration was not inclined to provide educational facilities, he 'should be inclined to advise that not a single school should be opened for the next two years'.[3] Under the circumstances, however, he recommended that one or two primary schools be opened and that subsidies be given to the American Mission Schools under Mr. John Van Ess and to the Carmelite Frères School. The opening of other schools would have to be left to the future.[4] Thus from the beginning, the necessity of encouraging education to provide youths for government service became a guiding factor and stimulated the establishment of educational facilities where the natural tendency on the part of the British authorities was to restrict

[1] A pre-war Budget for Baghdad Wilayet was:

Law School and Secondary School	£T. 9,000
Other schools (from Local Revenue)	£T.25,000
Total	£T.34,000

Revenue Report, 1917, p. 45.

[2] Dobbs, H. R. C., Notes on Education, February 15th, 1915.

[3] Ibid., para. 2.

[4] Ibid., para. 11.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

They, and Arabs in general, viewed the assignment of mandates in the same light as did Lord Curzon when, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he said in the House of Lords, June 25th, 1920:

> It is quite a mistake to suppose . . . that under the Covenant of the League, or any other instrument, the gift of the mandate rests with the League of Nations. It does not do so. It rests with the Powers who have conquered the territories, which it then falls to them to distribute, and it was in these circumstances that the mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia was conferred upon and accepted by us, and that the mandate for Syria was conferred upon and accepted by France.[1]

One of the first results of the announcement in Baghdad was a series of secret meetings of the Nationalist leaders who resolved on still stronger measures of propaganda and on a closer *rapprochement* between Shī'is and Sunnīs. Counter-demands to the Bonham-Carter proposals, well known in Baghdad at the time, were also to be formulated and presented to the British Government, by the *Mandubīn* or Delegates. This body of fifteen or seventeen Nationalists had been selected from the larger group and the list had then been submitted, in the autumn of 1919, for approval to a political gathering in one of the mosques. This had been given.[2]

To further the Shī'a-Sunnī *rapprochement*, religious services known as *maulūds*, in honour of the birth of the Prophet, were organized in the month of Ramadhan, beginning May 19th. In these *maulūds*, held alternately in every Shī'a and Sunnī mosque, leading members of the two sects took part, by special invitation of the mosque authorities or of the secular heads of the city quarter in which the mosques were located. Following the religious ceremonies, which usually combined both Sunnī and Shī'a rites, were patriotic speeches and poems appealing to patriotism, honour, and religion.

[1] *Parl. Debates*, H. of L., 5th S., Vol. XL (1920), p. 877.
[2] According to Saiyid Muhammad al-Sadr.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHI Iraq MHI

had been sent to the Euphrates area by the Council to study civil reorganization; to the Muntafiq *Liwā*, until the British troops had been withdrawn; and to the Kurdish districts until their future status had been decided. Sir Percy Cox had already approved of the creation of the Baghdad Municipal Council which, although sanctioned under the previous regime, had been so mistrusted and so hedged with limitations as to be valueless as an instrument of government. The new Council had full executive and financial powers, subject to the general supervision of the *Mutasarrif* of the *Liwā*.

Appointments to administrative offices were vested in the Council of State, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, by Section XIV of the Instructions.[1] In practice, this arrangement was applied by the Council of State only to those posts for which the Sultan's *firmān* had been required under the Ottoman regime. For other posts, appointments were made on the authority of the Minister concerned. In all cases, however, it was understood that no appointments involving the displacement of British or Indian officials were to be proposed to the Council without previous consultation with the High Commissioner.

The actual transfer of power in the provinces awaited the re-establishment of comparative peace and stability. Not until January 10th, therefore, following the return of Ja'far Pasha and the Commission from the Euphrates area, was the Minister of Interior permitted to put forward his first list of administrative appointments.[2]

The principal criticism of the list came from Shī'a sources. Their original grievances, other than inherent opposition to the British-controlled provisional Government itself, had been

[1] Appendix VI.

[2] Only four major administrative appointments had been made previously by the Council, all in Baghdad and vicinity; Mahmūd Nādim Beg Tabaqjalī, *Qaimmāqam* of Mandalī, November 19th, 1920; Mumtaz Beg al-Daftarī, *Qaimmāqam* of Kādhimain, November 21st, 1920; 'Ahmad Beg, *Qaimmāqam* of Sāmarrā, December 1st, 1920; Rashīd Beg al-Khojah, *Mutasarrif* of Baghdad, December 11th, 1920.

that no Shī'ī held a portfolio on the Council. Their resentment was not decreased by the fact that of five *Mutasarrifs* and nine *Qaimmāqams* on the list, only one, a *Qaimmāqam*, was of their sect. The High Commissioner, however, realized the difficulty of avoiding Sunnī appointments. Only a few trained and experienced Shī'īs were available as a result both of their habitual boycott of Turkish service and professional schools and of official Turkish discouragement to the entrance of Shī'īs into office and schools. The list with minor alterations was, therefore, approved in late January, 1921. When, however, the predominantly Sunnī Council continued to indicate, by appointing Sunnīs to the almost entirely Shī'a districts along the Euphrates, that it was prepared to do little to conciliate hostile opinion of the sect, the High Commissioner felt obliged to make a firm stand for the appointment of Shī'īs to such places, at least, where members of the sect predominated. After considerable persuasion, also, a place in the Council was found for a Shī'ī, the Ministry of Education being offered to Saiyid Muhammad Mahdī Tobatabai of Karbalā.

The reorganization of the Judicial Department under the new administration entailed comparatively few changes. Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who now became Adviser to the Ministry of Justice, had early adopted the policy of making the fullest use of 'Iraqīs as judges and officials, and of making no alterations in the institutions and laws with which the people were familiar, except in cases of clear necessity. The idea itself of an Arab Minister was not new. Sir Edgar had suggested such an appointment in early 1919,[1] but it had been deemed premature.

Reorganization of the Criminal Courts became necessary, however, when the Council of State adopted its scheme of reconstructing provincial administration along the lines of the Turkish system. One of the essential features of that system was the complete separation of the executive from the judicial

[1] Memorandum on Place of the Arab in Administration, February 5th, 1919.

6:Ireland S-5 (no date)1937 MHl Iraq MHl

'Iraqī viewpoints[1] and, in two cases, to alleged lack of confidence by Parliament[2] had unfortunate consequences. On the one hand, the smooth course of administration was interrupted by the change of administrative officials which usually accompanied the change of Ministry, and by the dislike of subordinate officials of assuming responsibility and initiative, never more evident than in the absence of a Minister. The fact that the dislocation was not greater may be attributed to the presence of British Advisers in the Ministries and in the key positions. On the other hand, public regard for the Council of Ministers was undoubtedly weakened and opportunities for a strong man to achieve dictatorial power were increased.

The twenty-one Cabinets between 1921 and October, 1936, have been repeatedly formed from a group of some two score men. The inability, or reluctance as 'Iraqī critics of the Council maintain, to find a wider selection of men of Cabinet standard has been accentuated by the necessity of incorporating within the Council representatives of the Shī'a sect which, although forming a majority of 'Iraq's population, has been unable even to the present day, to provide experienced officials to the same extent as the Sunnī sect, due to the reluctance of the sect to acquire secular education. Furthermore, the harmony of the Cabinets has not been enhanced by the inclusion of members of the mutually antagonistic sects.

It has been no secret that public opinion, its confidence shaken in the Council and in Parliament, has leaned increasingly towards Turkey and Kemal Atatürk as suitable models for 'Iraq. Many leading 'Iraqīs have expressed admiration openly for Atatürk, several politicians, including Yāsīn Pasha, being credited with personal desires to emulate his role.

The seizure of power by General Baqir Sidqī and Hikmat

[1] Three Ministries resigned rather than abandon the 'Iraqī viewpoint when it came into collision with that of the British Government: the second of Ja'far Pasha, January 7th, 1928; the third of 'Abdul Muhsin Beg, January 20th, 1929; and that of Nājī Pasha, March 9th, 1930.

[2] *Supra*, p. 422, note.

7: International Bank N, S-4 (1951) 1952 MH1 Iraq MH1

congested living conditions combined with a coarse and monotonous diet.

In common with many other countries, there has been a drift to the towns, and unsanitary slums have formed on the outskirts of some cities. Steps should be taken to improve the living conditions of these slum dwellers. So far sewers and sewage disposal are generally lacking in the cities and towns. Baghdad has septic tanks and cesspools, but there are still some open drains; most of the larger towns have similar systems of sewage disposal but conditions in the smaller towns and villages are still very primitive. The disposal of household refuse and the cleaning of streets are generally well carried out in the bigger cities but not in most towns and villages.

Constant pilgrimage traffic creates another problem in public health. The holy shrines of the Shia sect of Moslems are in Iraq and a large number of Iraqis are members of this sect. There is a continuous stream of travelers through the country, including both Iraqis and foreigners, mostly Iranians, visiting the holy shrines, and Iraqi and foreign pilgrims on their way to Mecca. All this traffic exposes Iraq to the dangers of imported epidemic disease and stringent quarantine regulations have been enacted. But the land frontier with Iran is so long that it is quite certain many incoming pilgrims never are subjected to any control measures. This means that Iraq needs internal preventive services of the highest possible standard. Currently, all pilgrims leaving Iraq for Mecca are vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against cholera.

The need for greater emphasis on preventive measures stands out clearly in even a brief analysis of the most debilitating diseases and their causes.

Intestinal Disorders

Ankylostomiasis (hookworm disease) in itself produces anemia. Many patients are so weak by the time they reach a hospital that they require lengthy treatment. It thrives in an unsanitary environment characterized by inadequate sewage disposal, open drains, and lack of proper latrines. Incomplete surveys indicate that it is most prevalent in the South.

3 Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date) 1954 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

the right to establish and maintain schools for the instruction of their members in their own languages, and provides that government appointments shall be made without discrimination in accordance with capacity. Parliament must, by law, contain six Christian deputies; the provision for a similar number of Jewish deputies was cancelled after the emigration of 1951–2 had left the Jewish community insufficient members to qualify for representation.

It is absolutely impossible to reckon with any accuracy the strength of the various religious communities. At a very rough approximation the Muslims might be estimated at 4½ million, Christians at 150,000, Jews (since the emigration of some 130,000) at something less than 10,000, and other groups at 50,000.

(*a*) *Islam*

The Sunni and Shii sects are suspicious and intolerant of each other, as are also the Arab and Kurdish members of the Sunni group. Statistics are lacking, but it would appear that the Shiis slightly outnumber the Sunni Arabs and are less than Sunni Arabs and Kurds combined.

The Sunnis live mainly in the north of Iraq and in the *liwas* of Baghdad, Diala, and Dulaim. There is one notable Sunni shrine in the country, that of Shaikh Abdul-Qadir al-Gailani, whose mosque and tomb in Baghdad are a centre of pilgrimage from regions as remote as India.

The Shiis form a majority in the central *liwas* of Kut, Diwaniya, Kerbela, and Hilla and in the southern *liwas* of Basra, Amara, and Muntafiq. Their religious life has as its background the four Holy Cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Kadhimain, and Samarra and their shrines. Najaf is the burial place of Ali, the first Imam; Kerbela of Hussain, the third Imam. Thousands of Shiis from Persia, Afghanistan, and India take part in the traditional pilgrimages to the Holy Cities, where, during the first ten days of the religious month of Muharram, is enacted the famous Passion Play commemorating the death of Hussain ibn Ali at the battle of Kerbela in A.D. 680. The Shii Mujtahids exercise not only religious but at times also political influence, as was demonstrated in the tribal insurrection of 1920 and on numerous subsequent occasions. The Shiis are rectifying their exclusion under Ottoman rule from political and administrative power and their non-participation in advanced education; some recent Cabinets have contained more than four Shiis, and in 1953–4 there was a Shii Prime Minister.

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 MI Middle East
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(c) *Jews*

Until recently Iraq contained a large community of Jews whose families had been settled in the country for hundreds or even thousands of years. They lived mostly in the large towns, especially Baghdad, in whose economic life they played an important part as merchants, financiers, manufacturers, and members of the professions. There were also Kurdish-speaking Jews in the north, mostly urban traders and craftsmen but also rural cultivators. A law of 1931 gave Jewish communities self-government in their own affairs, and there was a highly organized communal life, with schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions. In consequence of events in Palestine the majority of Jews left Iraq in 1950–1, mostly for Israel.

(d) *Yazidis*

These are vulgarly known as 'devil-worshippers' but, although their religion includes the propitiation of Satan, it might more justly be described as an amalgam of Christian, Muslim, and Magian elements. They are divided between Jebel Sinjar and the Shaikhan district north of Mosul, speak a Kurdish dialect, except in their rites, where Arabic is used, and are probably of Kurdish origin.

(e) *Sabians*

('Baptists'), also called the Mandaeans and the 'Christians of St John'; their religion combines elements of various origins and periods. Most of them are craftsmen—especially silversmiths—in the large towns.

(f) *Shabak*

Of Kurdish origin, who live in the area of the Yazidis and are not clearly distinguished from them; their religion contains Yazidi and extreme Shii elements.

(g) *Other Sects*

Include Bahais, Sarlis, Kakais, Qizilbashis, none of them of any political significance.

Political History

Written history began in Iraq at the end of the fourth millennium B.C., but archaeological remains from much earlier periods, first in the north and later also in the south, give evidence of palaeolithic man, of agricultural neolithic man and, from the sixth and fifth millennia, of increasing human progress expressed successively in extensive agriculture, copper

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

[Marsh Arabs]

The local governor is an efficient and more or less benevo-
511 lent man and seemed to be very well liked. The group as a whole enjoys a degree of prosperity and comfort most unusual for an Arab community. Everybody has enough to eat and enough to wear and a good house to live in. Crops seem to be quite reliable. If the wheat and barley harvest fails, the rice does not. Taxes are light and the local government good.

565 The most conspicuous difference from the typical agri-
463 cultural community in Arabia lies in the fact that here the old equality of the desert is preserved. There is no class of rich citizens who outshine their fellows. There are a few merchants of a small sort. Amara, the nearest city, is so close to the town we visited that the shops were very small, most of the trading being done in the larger city. We saw few artisans. The community seemed to be free from caste divisions and to enjoy a spirit of equality and brotherhood much like that of the Bedouins themselves.

562 Another surprising thing is the freedom of all classes. The women have discarded the veil completely and associate with the men freely, being seen on the street apparently under no restraint whatever. This is a refreshing contrast to the other communities of Arabs; indeed the Marsh Arabs are far ahead of even the Bedouins in this respect. These women buy and sell in the bazaar and appear to participate in all the activities of the town with no hesitation whatever. They visited the temporary dispensary that we set up and in their self-assertion were
795 sometimes harder to manage than the men. It is interesting to note that these Arabs are all Shiahs. "No," said the guard that accompanied us from Ahwaz as we were coming in for a visit, "there are no infidels in all this district. Every one is a Shiah."

5: Harrison D-4 (1912-1924) 1924 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1
Turkish Period M2

with, but even the admittedly great difficulties of her task do not excuse her utter failure. Although she has had hundreds of years of opportunity to exert her abilities in harmonizing the different races which make up her population, they are now more discordant than ever, and we had during the war the hideous spectacle of the dominant race deliberately attempting to exterminate one of the insubordinate subject races in cold blood, certainly a sufficient confession of failure.

The Sabaeans or fire-worshippers of Mesopotamia furnish a notable example of Turkish ineptitude in facing this difficult problem of assimilating alien races. The Sabaeans are the remnants of the pre-Islamic population of Mesopotamia who refused to become Moslems in the days of the Moslem conquest. They have been, and so far as their diminished numbers permit they still are, a most valuable asset to the country. They are by far the best artisans in the Arab world. Some of their silver work surpasses the best that India can offer. This community, which is absolutely peaceable and knows nothing of the arts of war, has been harried and persecuted until now there remains only the smallest fraction of their original numbers. They now number less than ten thousand, if their own estimates can be trusted, and their complete disappearance is apparently a matter of only a short time.

Another indictment that must be brought against the Turk in the Arab world is the fact that he failed utterly as a civilizing force. This was his fault and not simply his misfortune, as might be argued of an Arab ruler who has never seen the vision of the government as a force working to uplift society. In Hasa sanitation was not improved even in the most elementary way. No

20: Hourani S-5 (1945) 1947 M1 Middle East
Iraq MH1

economically dependent on the British. Quite apart from the economic dangers of this, there were signs that they once more hoped for autonomy under British protection. The danger of such hopes is too obvious to need explanation. 563

The Other Christians

Apart from the Assyrians, the Christians in Iraq are mainly Chaldaeans, Syrian Orthodox and Catholics, and Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, with smaller numbers of Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and other Uniates, and Protestants. The communities are recognized by the Government as possessing competence in matters of personal status and other internal affairs. 563 795

Here, as in the other countries, the Christians are more fully an urban community than the Moslems, and show a peculiar aptitude for commerce, crafts and the professions; but there is also a large peasant community, Chaldaean, Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic, in the plains around Mosul. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the proportion of educated Christians is higher than that of educated Moslems, and they are further advanced on the road to Westernization, thanks to the work of foreign missions and schools. 563 369 871

The Armenians are a trading community in the towns. They preserve their language and traditions carefully, but they are too few to be able to avoid some measure of external assimilation. The other Christians are partly Syriac-speaking, partly Arabic. This cannot, however, be regarded as a sharp distinction, since the language used depends upon the environment in which they are living, and many of them are bi-lingual. In general, it is true that those whose native language is now Arabic spoke Syriac until recent generations, and that with few exceptions they are not conscious of belonging to the Arab nation. 563

In spite of efforts to spread the conception of a 'Syriac' people, the general tendency among the Christians is towards at least a superficial Arabization. This raises the question of their relation towards the Arab nationalist movement. So far, they have regarded it with fear and hostility, apart from some individuals who have supported it with enthusiasm. The nationalists too have tended to suspect them, although the existence of the much greater Kurdish and Shi'i problems has diverted attention from them. What the future relationship will be depends very 563 668

44:Matthews and Akrawi S, G-3 (1945-1946)1949 M1 Middle East
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Mosul, and Basrah and a day secondary school for girls in Baghdad.

The Jewish communities in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basrah are typical of associations primarily interested in the education and welfare of their own religious group. Both free and tuition schools of kindergarten, primary, and secondary level are administered by the community councils, and it is thought that nearly all Jewish children have a chance to become at least literate. In addition to full day and evening schools, which bear resemblance to government schools of equal level, these communities have workshops for poorer children. These provide training in sewing and crafts, and elementary work in reading, mathematics, and religious literature. In the early twenties these communities took over the administration of the Alliance Israelite Universelle schools, which now supply teachers for the communities. Teachers of such schools are paid by the local community. Other religious groups, such as the Assyrians, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholics, Roman Catholics, Chaldeans, and Armenians, also maintain schools.

Iraq's only foreign primary schools are the 5 which provide instruction for Iranian boys from families of merchants and craftsmen who have long been residents of Iraq. These schools are located in Baghdad, Basrah, Karbala, and Najaf. There is also an intermediate Iranian school in Basrah.

All other foreign schools are controlled and financed by American agencies. Basrah has an intermediate school of this type, and Baghdad has 3 complete secondary schools, 2 for boys and 1 for girls.

The oldest of these schools is the American School for Boys in Basrah, founded by the Dutch Reform Mission early in this century. Its principal, Dr. John Van Ess, author of *Meet the Arab*,[1] has long been associated with education in Iraq, having served as its first Director of Education during the British occupation in 1915. This School provides education through the third year of the secondary course for poorer boys from Basrah and the surrounding villages. It stresses both high academic standards and the development of high moral character, and its graduates are in demand in business enterprises of the vicinity. The School opens its extensive play areas to poor boys who live near the school and provides one of its buildings for use as a recreation center by former students and their friends. Elementary instruction in the first four grades is provided for girls; both the girls school and the primary section of the school for boys are classified as private schools and have Iraqi citizens as their principals. More advanced instruction is offered girls on an informal basis through the Young Woman's Club.

[1] New York: John Day Co., 1943.

63:Simmons et al G-5 (1941-1951) 1954
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132 year in the plains of the delta region and 12 to 16 inches in the upland districts, while in some sections of the mountains it increases to around 50 inches. The summer temperatures are uniformly high and may reach 110° to 125° F. in the central and the southern provinces. The daily fluctuations are slight in the Gulf region, but they become more pronounced toward the interior. During the winter months snows are rare outside the highland districts, but frosts are occasionally encountered as far south as Basra. In January, the coldest month, the mean maximum temperature averages 60° to 65° F. at Basra, 58° to 61° F. at Baghdad and 50° to 55° F. at Mosul; the mean minimum temperature, 38° to 42° F., 44° to 47° F. and 34° to 36° F., respectively. The mean maximum temperatures approximate 104° to 110° F. in all 3 localities in July, while the mean minimum temperatures range from 76° to 82° F. in Basra to 72° to 75° F. in Mosul. In midsummer the mean daily relative humidity rarely rises above 25 to 35 per cent on the plains, although it is often excessive in the Gulf area. Northwest winds, known locally as the *shamal*, blow irregularly throughout the year. They are especially strong and desiccating during the summer months, and, in the south, are usually laden with dust and sand.

POPULATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Population

161 The population, according to the official census for 1947, was estimated at 4,799,500, including an unknown number of Bedouin, roughly calculated at about 250,000. The majority of the inhabitants are of mixed Arabic stock, representing a relatively homogeneous blend of ancient Semitic and Indo-European strains which has evolved over centuries of successive conquests. About 95 per cent of the people are Moslems; slightly over one half are Shiites; and most of the remainder are Sunnites. The Kurds, who

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[131] inhabit the mountainous districts near the 162 northeastern frontiers, constitute the largest 795 Moslem minority group. Racially and linguistically distinct, they make up about 15 to 20 per cent of the population. Other non-Arabic Moslem communities include about 50,000 each of Turkomans and Iranians, the majority of whom are also found in the northern provinces. Most of the Kurds and the Turkomans are Sunnites, but some adhere to minor heterodox sects; the Iranians are Shiites.

From 150,000 to 200,000 native Christians reside in Iraq. The Chaldeans, a sect which observes early Nestorian rites but owes allegiance to the Vatican, comprise the most numerous group. Other communities include some 30,000 Assyrians (Nestorians), refugees from Asia Minor in 1918, and smaller contingents belonging to the Armenian Orthodox, the Greek Orthodox, the Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) and the Syrian 563 Catholic churches. Most of the Christian peoples live together in more or less separate ethnic and religious groups: about 70 per cent are settled in the northern provinces of Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil, and a large proportion of the remainder in the cities of Baghdad and Basra. Prominent among other indigenous sects are the Yezidis, or so-called "devil-worshipers," about 30,000 of whom dwell in the districts near the Syrian border. A few thousand Sabians, famous as silver craftsmen, also live in Baghdad, Amarah and Basra.

191 Arabic is spoken by over three quarters of the population. Kurdish, Syriac and Turki, however, are recognized as official languages in limited areas in the north, while English is extensively used in the 593 larger cities. Although the Iraqi are pre-
162 dominantly Arabs, marked gradations in social structure are represented by the nomadic Bedouin tribes of the deserts, the "marsh Arabs" or primitive tribesmen of the Amarah and Hammar lakes region of the southern delta, the rural peasants and the townspeople. Up to 1950, the population included about 200,000 Jews, primarily of